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Abstract
This article examines the media history of one of the hallmark civil nuclear energy programs in
Western Germany – the development of Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor (LMFBR) technology.
Promoted as a kind of perpetuum mobile of the Atomic Age, the "German Manhattan Project" not
only imported big science thinking. In its context, nuclear technology was also put forth as an
avantgarde of scientific inquiry, dealing with the most complex and 'critical' technological endeavors.
In the face of the risks of nuclear technology, German physicist Wolf Häfele thus announced a novel
epistemology of
"hypotheticality". In a context where traditional experimental engineering strategies became
inappropiate, he called for the application of advanced media technologies: Computer Simulations
(CS) and Systems Analysis (SA) generated computerized spaces for the production of knowledge. In
the course of the German Fast Breeder program, such methods had a twofold impact. One the one
hand, Häfele emphazised – as the "father of the German Fast Breeder" – the utilization of CS for the
actual planning and construction of the novel reactor type. On the other, namely as the director of the
department of Energy Systems at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA),
Häfele advised SA-based projections of energy consumption. These computerized scenarios provided
the rationale for the conception of Fast Breeder programs as viable and necessary 'alternative energy
sources' in the first place. By focusing on the role of the involved CS techniques, the paper thus
investigates the intertwined systems thinking of nuclear facilities’s planning and construction and the
design of large-scale energy consumption and production scenarios in the 1970s and 1980s, as well as
their conceptual afterlives in our contemporary era of computer simulation.
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Wolf in Wonderland 
Located in a sparsely populated region not far from the border to the neighboring 
Netherlands, the small German town of Kalkar could well have remained in a 
state of comfortable oblivion. As the city’s website tells its visitors, Kalkar pre-
served a touch of medieval charm from its founding years in the 1230s and had 
his heydays in the 15th century – followed by a rapid decline in the 16th century. 
However, after having fallen into a 500-years-long Rip van Wrinkle sleep, Kalkar 
was woken up by a belated and unexpected wirtschaftswunder at the beginning of 
the 1970s. Typical for sparsely populated and structurally backward regions, it 
became the object of quite dubious governmental and business games. Some-
times, such regional development initiatives result in the establishment of provin-
cial airports or amusement parks, sometimes in industrial parks or – at least in 
1970s Western Germany – even in the set-up of nuclear power plants. And in 
some especially illustrious cases two of these possible advancements overlap. 
Kalkar just happens to be such a case, effected by the construction and history of 
Germany’s first large-scale Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor (LMFBR) SNR-
300. The project, being promoted as a kind of perpetuum mobile of the Atomic 
Age, and thus funded with about 7 Billion Deutsche Mark (DM), initially was the 
reason for Kalkar’s delayed economic miracle. But from the start it became clear 
that SNR-300 – the number indicated the intended power output of 300 Mega-
watts – was challenged by tremendous technical predicaments. And from the mid-
1970s onwards, it also faced fierce resistance as the German public grew more 
and more critical and sensitive on nuclear technology. Completed in 1985, the 
Fast Breeder was set in ‘partial operation’. The cooling systems run for years, but 
the plant never received nuclear material and hence did not produce energy. Fi-
nally, on March 21, 1991, former Bundesforschungsminister Heinz Riesenhuber 
announced the termination of the LMFBR. And as an effect, the remains of this 
epitome of FRG’s nuclear technology were bargained to a Dutch scrap merchant 
and investor for the alleged amount of 2,5 Million DM. Since then, the site drags 
out its afterlive as an amusement park called Wunderland Kalkar, with its brute, 
up to 93 meters tall concrete architecture and its mascot ‘Kernie’ as eerie remem-
brances of its past. 
The paper examines the SNR-300 project from a historical and epistemo-
logical media studies perspective. It is conceptually situated in a specific context 
of New German Media Theory1 which explores the epistemic impact of (novel) 
media technologies in different scientific fields. In this line of thoughts the case 
study thus concretely investigates the implementation of a novel epistemology in 
                                                        
1
 See Grey Room 29: New German Media Theory, ed. Eva Horn (Cambridge: MIT Press 
2007) 
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nuclear sciences. In the face of the involved highly dangerous nuclear processes, 
uncertainties and scaling effects in civil nuclear energy projects, traditional ex-
perimental and engineering approaches became utterly inadequate. The LMFBR 
programs called for media technologies which would provide a space for ‘virtual 
experimentation’ – and this call was met by computer simulations. The hypothesis 
of this article is that the German LMFBR program is informative for a conception 
of an afterlife of systems in a twofold way: First, the SNR-300’s techno-history 
can be perceived as an outstanding example for an era in which some apostles of 
civil nuclear energy production portrayed nuclear technology as the avantgarde of 
scientific research. Western Germany’s physicist and ‘father of the Fast Breeder’, 
Wolf Häfele, celebrated the leading-edge status of nuclear technology precisely 
because it had to deal with inevitable uncertainties: For Häfele, the Atomic Age 
was characterized by a thorough “hypotheticality”: “The process of iteration be-
tween theory and experiment which leads to truth in its traditional sense is no 
longer possible. Such truth can no longer be fully experienced. This means that 
arguments in the hypothetical domain necessarily and ultimately remain inconclu-
sive”.2 When traditional methods of experimenting and modelling became inap-
propriate, and when a conventional, experimental trial-and-error-based knowledge 
production was entirely prohibitive because of the involved nuclear endanger-
ments, Häfele demanded an epistemology which was able to describe the modes 
of the ‘hypothetical domain.’ Due to the fact that the ‘test mode’ of a facility like 
a Fast Breeder was always at the same time the ‘case of emergency’, the construc-
tion, risk management, and control of LMFBRs required the development and 
employment of CS. These opened up extended knowledge spaces as virtual ex-
perimenting and testing grounds and provided a synthetic perspective on multiple 
non-linear dynamics in the planning and engineering of such highly complex sys-
tems. 
Second, the application of computer simulations in the technical planning 
and operational set-up of power plants strongly relates to yet another computer 
simulation paradigm. In 1973, Wolf Häfele also became director of the depart-
ment of Energy Systems at the newly founded International Institute for Applied 
Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Laxenburg, located closely to the Austrian capital of 
Vienna. Building upon social simulations in the tradition of systems analysis – the 
most prominent at that time had been Jay W. Forrester’s modellings for David 
Meadows’s epochal publication The Limits to Growth – Häfele’s working group 
developed possible (world-wide) energy production scenarios. Thereby, it de-
picted the indispensable role of nuclear technology for an endurable planetary 
future. While contemporary critics described these as obnoxious ‘plutonium 
                                                        
2
 Wolf Häfele, “Hypotheticality and the New Challenges,” in Facing up to Nuclear Pow-
er, ed. John Francis and Paul Albrecht (Edinburgh: St Andrews Press, 1976), 55. 
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worlds’ (Robert Jungk) which would ruin the future of all mankind and called for 
a complete change of direction in the assessment of nuclear energy, these CS sce-
narios nevertheless provided the rationale for the extended engagement in ‘avant-
garde technologies’ like Fast Breeders. 
The article thus investigates the intertwined system thinking of two CS 
paradigms: On the one hand, nuclear facilities’ planning and construction, and on 
the other the design of large-scale energy consumption and production scenarios 
in the 1970s and 1980s. This perspective not only enables a critical evaluation of 
the afterlife of such systems in actual ‘sustainable’ energy production models and 
simulations. It also argues that in a time of hypothetical thinking and research 
strategies, the technocratic vanguards of the Atomic Age simply forgot to include 
one paramount factor into their simulation scenarios which – at least in Western 
Germany – finally brought their systems thinking to the fall: That is, the incorpo-
ration of social and political acceptance. 
 
The German Manhattan Project 
Wolf Häfele was involved in the development of the SNR-300’s technology in 
leading positions since the beginning of the 1960s. As a speaker of the early Ger-
man Fast Breeder research projects KNK-I and II (Compact Natrium-Cooled Nu-
clear Facility Karlsruhe), he realized that the successful implementation of Big 
Science depended on professional marketing and political lobbying strategies. It 
was not a coincidence that he referred to the US-American Manhattan Project 
when promoting the German Fast Breeder program. In order to organize a giant 
leap forward on contemporary high-tech terrain, Häfele announced an era of “pro-
ject science” in the FRG. His “German Manhattan Project”3 was designed to catch 
up with other industrialized countries after years of restrictions regarding nuclear 
technologies which followed World War II – or to even outperform these coun-
tries. As the heart of a ‘sustainable’ nuclear energy production system, the devel-
opment of LMFBRs thus can be seen as a birthplace of big science in Germany. 
According to a critical review in the news magazine Der Spiegel in 1981, Häfeles 
project thereby turned former research logics upside down: It would first define 
the desirable results, and then start to initialize the means and the research initia-
tives to achieve these outcomes. At the same time, the advocates of nuclear sci-
ence asserted that the program would put the country in a global leadership role 
for the mastering of future energy needs of industrialized societies in the face of 
diminishing natural resources. 
                                                        
3
 See Werner Mayer-Larsen: “Der Koloss von Kalkar” In: Der Spiegel 43 (1981), 42-55. 
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But Häfele not only emphasized the need for thinking big (science). He 
also underlined the epistemological “pathfinder role” of nuclear technologies for 
scientific thinking as such. For the ‘Breeder-Professor’, the relevant questions for 
science consisted of describing complex relations and contingent events and – 
incorporated as the research in nuclear technologies – had to leave behind classi-
cal epistemic strategies: 
The traditional engineering approach to eliminating risks […] 
which are integral to contingency – is trial and error. The engineer 
learns by experience to make better and safer machines. This is 
close to the scientific approach: a hypothesis is made which is fol-
lowed by experiments, which in turn lead to an improved hypothe-
sis, which again is followed by experiments. In this way a theory 
evolves which is true, i.e. is in touch with reality […]. It is precise-
ly this interplay between theory and experiment, or trial and error, 
which is no longer possible for new technologies which are de-
signed to master unique challenges.4 
The SNR-300 project exemplarily illustrates the epistemological layout of this 
novel practice of scientific inquiry: As soon as nuclear technologies transform 
from notes on paper to actually constructed plants and technologies, they are 
characterized by an irreducible contingency.5 Since nuclear reactions are not to 
any amount scalable down to laboratory experiments because of the involved 
critical masses of nuclear fuels, realistic test runs oftentimes can only be initiated 
in the already completed facility. The test case thus moves from a preparatory side 
to the actual and ‘serious’ operation of a facility.6 As an effect, nuclear technol-
ogy becomes a research area of “interactive complexity” and “tight coupling”, as 
Charles Perrow notes in his classic Normal Accidents. Living with High Risk 
Technologies.7 And this happens long before the field of Complexity Science 
starts to emerge in the 1980s. First and foremost, a highly complex facility like a 
LMFBR demands research and engineering strategies which cannot longer be 
                                                        
4
 Häfele, “Hypotheticality,” 53-54. The IIASA associate Philipp Pahner advances Thom-
as Kuhn’s notion of a paradigm shift in order to describe the scientific culture of the 
Atomic Age. See Philipp D. Pahner, “Risk Assessment in the Nuclear Age,” IIASA 
Working Paper WP-75-58: 1975: 3-4. 
5
 Häfele, “Hypotheticality,” 53. 
6
 Olson McKinley e.g. describes unsuccessful test series with a 25-cm reactor model, see 
Olson McKinley, Unacceptable Risk: The Nuclear Power Controversy (New York: 
Bantam Books, 1976). 
7
 Klaus Traube, “Vorwort,” in Normale Katastrophen. Die unvermeidbaren Risiken der 
Großtechnik, ed. Charles Perrow (Frankfurt am Main/New York: Campus Verlag, 
1987), xi. 
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elicited in the framework of traditional strategies of theorizing and experimenta-
tion – be it with regard to the regulation of physical chain reactions or the con-
structional realizations. Second, these technologies raise immense difficulties in 
estimating possible effects on the building materials and the environment. These 
become subject to projective risk assessments. And third, LMFBR technology 
only gains its status as a ‘logical’, desirable and economically feasible alternative 
energy source in the course and context of broader, also projective global energy 
consumption scenarios which are based on a specific set of underlying (and ques-
tionable) assumptions.8 
No wonder that the systematic nescience which surrounds these poten-
tially extremely dangerous technologies evoked severe criticism, with Häfele 
serving as a primary target. The Austrian author Robert Jungk picked him apart in 
a chapter of his anti-nuclear energy pamphlet The Nuclear State,9 entitled “The 
Players”. The section refers to those nuclear physicists who, at that time, pro-
claimed a lucent and clean new industrial age fuelled by the development of an 
immense future system of nuclear facilities.10 Häfele served as their figurehead, 
not only as the doubt-relieved advocate of the German nuclear energy program, 
but also as a deputy director and head of the Energy Systems department at II-
ASA. This unique think tank was run as a joint-venture of initially twelve partici-
pating nations, including the USA and the USSR. Across the frontier of the Iron 
Curtain, IIASA’s research groups developed global scenarios in the areas of popu-
lation dynamics, environmental issues, nutrition, and energy markets. 
In both fields, Häfele eagerly inseminated the novel epistemology which 
would hold for an operational handling of complexity, uncertainty and nescience 
– or, to use his neologism: for the domain of hypotheticality: 
Hypotheticality, of course, is not a word in the regular usage but its 
logic expresses precisely what must be expressed in the line of rea-
soning presented here. Its logic is the same as that of the word 
‘criticality’, for example, a term which is familiar to reactor engi-
neers. […A] reactor can become critical or a situation can be con-
sidered as hypothetical. The process of iteration between theory 
and experiment which leads to truth in its traditional sense is no 
longer possible. Such truth can no longer be fully experienced. 
                                                        
8
 See Wolf Häfele, ed., Energy in a Finite World. A Global Systems Analysis (Cambridge: 
Ballinger Publishing Company, 1981). 
9
 Robert Jungk, Der Atomstaat. Vom Fortschritt in die Unmenschlichkeit (München: 
Rowohlt, 1977), 41-69. 
10
 Jungk, Der Atomstaat, 41-69. 
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This means that arguments in the hypothetical domain necessarily 
and ultimately remain inconclusive.11 
However, in order to generate an operational account for this “hypothetical do-
main”, he called for novel media-technological procedures and modes of “abstrac-
tion”.12 These would help to execute the dynamical and processural effects in 
question, and would exceed the heuristics of theorizing and experimentation. Only 
techniques like scenario building, systems analysis (as prominently featured on all 
levels at the IIASA), and advanced computer simulations were capable to opera-
tionalize the problem contexts, possible security precautions, or estimates of fu-
ture developments of the nuclear technologies in question. Without (analogue) 
techniques like scenario building and (digital) media technologies like computer 
simulations, the domain of hypotheticality would remain inaccessible for calcula-
tions of realistic threats and possible events. Häfele no longer connected ‘knowl-
edge’ to ‘truth’; in the domain of hypotheticality, ‘knowledge’ became a function 
of ‘sufficiently accurate’ calculations, statistical evaluations, and simulation re-
sults. In this context, CS provided an intermediate area, a differential space by 
generating ‘virtual’, dynamical test case scenarios which would prevent (catastro-
phic) eventualities in the ‘real world’. As an effect, CS were devised to contribute 
to the elimination of the potentiality of such catastrophes to happen. In other 
words, and quite paradoxically, these media technologies were designed to ham-
per the realization of catastrophic outcomes of nuclear energy facilities by realis-
ing such occurrences in rather ‘playful’ ways inside their ‘virtual’ media envi-
ronments. 
 
Messy Systems 
“[F]uture engineers may attempt the design of robots not only with a behavior, but 
also with a structure similar to that of a mammal. The ultimate model of a cat is of 
course another cat, whether it be born of still another cat or synthesized in a labo-
ratory.”13 With this example, Norbert Wiener referred to the transforming appre-
hension and status of computer simulations after 1945. After World War II, com-
puter technology provided the synthetic environment in which CS unfolded as 
“the process of representing a dynamic behavior of one system by the behavior of 
another system”14 and gained their significance in current scientific cultures. Or, 
                                                        
11
 Häfele, “Hypotheticality,” 55. 
12
 Häfele, “Hypotheticality,” 63. 
13
 Norbert Wiener, Arturo Rosenblueth and Julian Bigelow, “Behavior, Purpose and Tel-
eology,” Philosophy of Science 10 (1943): 18–24: 21. 
14
 Michel Serres and Nayla Farouki, ed., Thesaurus der Exakten Wissenschaften (Frank-
furt am Main: Zweitausendeins, 2004), 252. 
Vehlken / Plutonium Worlds
communication+1 Vol. 3 [2014], Iss. 1, Article 7
6
  
to put it another way: A paradigm which Michael Gibbons once termed “Mode-
1”-sciences – alluding to disciplines which were based on the experimental and 
mathematical mechanics of Newton – transformed into “Mode-2”-sciences whose 
non-linear problems had to be conceived of as a “behavioral science of sys-
tems”.15 Admittedly, Fast Breeders are not quite a sub-category of the abovemen-
tioned ‘cats.’ But as complex objects of inquiry they show a high degree of “in-
teractive complexity” and “tight coupling”. Charles Perrow described these in-
stances as a sudden, unforeseeable concurrence of distant and independent system 
characteristics. In one of his diverse examples from nuclear reactor incidents, a 
simple faucet inside a reactor’s containment structure which had not properly 
been closed by a cleaning brigade initiates a complex and non-linear succession of 
unlikely events of backflows and pressure modulations which finally resulted in a 
release of radioactive material into the structure. These interactions in the piping 
system, writes Perrow, were unforeseeable for the cleaning staff, as well as for the 
operators in the control room and the designers of the system. Only in an ex-post 
and step-by-step manner, the sequence of such hazardous incidents could be re-
constructed.16 And possible reciprocal effects of the manifold system elements 
can only be evaluated up to a certain degree: 
The more complex the system and the interactions between its 
components, the more likely is the occurrence of unexpected dis-
turbances, the more ambivalent and thus misreadable are the sig-
nals which indicate the state of the disturbed system, and the more 
destabilizing instead of stabilizing can the reactions of operators or 
of automatic control systems become. The closer the individual 
components of the system (in terms of time, space, function) are 
coupled, the greater becomes the probability that local disturbances 
affect further elements of the system […].17 
In the course of the development process of SNR-300 and his predecessors KNK-
I and II, the interdependencies e.g. of nuclear fuels, cooling systems and building 
materials which cannot be sufficiently calculated by applying the classical theo-
rems of theoretical physics, have been extensively discussed. In a 1977s expert 
roundtable on the SNR-300 project at the German Ministry for Research and En-
                                                        
15
 See Michael Gibbons, “The Emergence of a New Mode of Knowledge Production,” in 
Social Studies of Science in an International Perspective. Proceedings of a Workshop, 
ed. Ulrike Felt and Helga Nowotny (Wien: Institut für Wissenschaftstheorie und Wis-
senschaftsforschung, 1994), 55-66. See Bernd Mahr, “Modellieren. Beobachtungen und 
Gedanken zur Geschichte des Modellbegriffs,” in Bild Schrift Zahl, ed. Horst Brede-
kamp and Sybille Krämer (München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2003), 59-86. 
16
 See Perrow, Normale Katastrophen, 113. 
17
 Traube, “Vorwort,” xi. 
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ergy, Häfele states that “physicians […] generally underestimate how difficult it is 
from an engineering perspective to get even only one single reactor type going. 
[...] The physics is quickly done, but the engineering and the commercial implica-
tions are only to be accomplished with great expenditures of time and money.”18 
However, the eerie thing is that these experiments – similar to the case of atomic 
bombs – have lasting effects on the real world since they are not contained within 
a laboratory setting. Furthermore, before their actual completion as a running re-
actor, the myriads of their components cannot be tested as a whole system.19 This 
contradicts not only traditional engineering approaches such as the trial-and-error-
based learning from past experience and the resulting step-by-step-improvement 
of a technical solution. It also unsettles the interplay of scientific hypotheses and 
experimental proofs. According to Häfele, contingency intervenes as the basic 
obstacle: “We can always improve our knowledge about contingent elements, but 
we can never make it complete. This restates the proposition that the residual risk 
can be made smaller than any given small number but it can never be reduced to 
zero.”20 
Nevertheless, the advocates of a bright nuclear energy future aimed at ex-
ploring the phenomena of interactive coupling as detailed as possible – with the 
help of the aforementioned ‘behavioral science of systems’. Their narrative pro-
posed the degrading of the system-immanent residual risks of a nuclear power 
plant to an insignificant level.21 In the case of SNR-300, this predicament resulted 
in two distinct procedures: First, the enforcement of extensive physical large-scale 
component tests. These involved large numbers of interacting sub-systems and 
helped to reduce the amount of unforeseeable events and variables in the interac-
tive coupling processes. The second procedure consisted of the application of sys-
tems analysis and computer simulation. These technologies enabled the engineers 
to build up an ‘archive’ of various computational scenarios of (hazardous) inci-
dents and systems disturbances. In the case of a real accident, it would have been 
feasible to refer to one or more similar scenarios from the database, in order to 
initiate appropriate anticipatory actions to the developing effects of the accident. 
Such novel computer-generated scenario techniques outperformed the traditional 
pen-and-paper techniques known e.g. from cold war strategy planning in think 
                                                        
18
 Hans Matthöfer, “Schnelle Brüter, pro und contra.” (Protocol of a Hearing at the Fed-
eral Ministry for Research and Technology, Villingen-Schwenningen, Germany, May 
19, 1977), 58. [Transl. SV]. 
19
 Jungk, Der Atomstaat, 48f. 
20
 Jungk, Der Atomstaat, 53. 
21
 See Lars Koch and Christer Petersen, “Störfall – Fluchtlinien einer Wissensfigur,” 
Störfälle. Zeitschrift für Kulturwissenschaften Nr. 2 (2011), ed. Joseph Vogl, 7. 
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tanks like RAND.22 Supported by computer technology, it became possible to 
calculate a multiplicity of cases. Following diagrammatical decision-tree struc-
tures, the researchers fathomed the eventualities and conditions of different 
courses of events in a narrative way. Henceforth, computer-assisted scenario 
building on the one hand fostered the comprehension of plurality, of decisive 
moments, of causality and non-linearity, and on the other promised to stagger the 
researchers with generating complexity even from restricted set of rules and in-
volved factors. As an outcome, computational scenarios not only separated the 
heuristic coupling of trial and error, since the computer experimental trials only 
generated ‘modelled errors’, discharged possible hazardous effects, and thus con-
veyed trial and error-processes into the area of nuclear technology. Computational 
scenario building also coupled different trial-and-error elements – or IF/THEN-
decisions – in decision trees.23 Their diversified paths and results then became 
subject to evaluation processes according to a relational decision matrix. This 
made the definition of ‘realistic’, ‘preferred’ etc. cases possible. And more often 
than not, the ‘extremata’, the less probable and most deficient scenarios proved to 
hold the best heuristic value – a value which could be yielded without jeopardiz-
ing the environment by experimenting with hazardous nuclear technology. 
 
Happenings 
Apart from such computational scenario techniques, the Western German 
LMFBR project made use of large-scale component tests in order to merge de-
tailed physical test series of interacting sub-components with comprehensive 
theoretical considerations about their interactive couplings. These then were pro-
jected onto the functioning of the completed future power plant. Or, as Häfele put 
it: 
For instance, the integrity of a pressure vessel is investigated as a 
sub-problem, and so is the operability of control rods and pumps. 
[...] In combining such components, more contingent elements 
come into the picture. The aim is to minimize the impact of in-
complete knowledge of contingent elements. Therefore [...] the 
largest possible units are sought.24 
                                                        
22
 See Thomas Brandstetter, Claus Pias and Sebastian Vehlken, “Think-Tank-Denken: 
Zur Epistemologie der  Beratung,” in Think Tanks. Die Beratung der Gesellschaft (Ber-
lin, Zurich: Diaphanes, 2010), 17-58. 
23
 See Wolf Häfele and Wolfgang Sassin, “Applications for Nuclear Power other than for 
Electricity Generation,” IIASA Working Paper RR-75-40 (1975), 33. 
24
 Häfele, “Hypotheticality,” 54 
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The tests were conducted in purpose-built experimental plants in Bensberg (FRG) 
and Hengelo (NL), where, for instance, steam turbines, cooling aggregates, detec-
tor systems against leakages, control panels, or the fluid dynamics of the cooling- 
and mediation circles were tested on a 1:1-scale.25 Although, for financial and 
time-saving reasons, not all sub-systems of the SNR-300 would be tested in these 
experimental plants. Via cooperations with other international nuclear energy pro-
jects, SNR-300 profited from some of their findings, experiences and data. How-
ever, this implied questions about the transferability and adequacy of such data, 
since all these large-scale tests had been irrevocably limited to generate knowl-
edge of only a restricted number of interactive couplings. Particularly, sensitive 
issues and hazardous scenarios remained in the area of theoretical reasoning and 
mathematical formalization – for example the diffusion of radioactive material 
into the atmosphere or the durability of shelter structures and containment meas-
ures. And quite ironically, some of the most reliable data which made its way into 
the mathematical modelling and assessment of the tests stemmed from past nu-
clear incidents.26 Only to a very little extent, these sensitive issues could be ap-
proached by laboratory experiments due to their restricted scalability. As an ef-
fect, the true large-scale component ‘test’ in civil nuclear technology always im-
plied the completed facility, and experimental reactors like KNK I and II served 
as indispensable precursors of SNR-300, which in itself was also conducted as 
only a preliminary stage for the development of a far larger future breeder, SNR-
2. At the same time, the true large-scale security test is nothing else than the ac-
tual case of emergency, a case with an inherent, irreducible nescience: Or, as 
Häfele put it: “[...O]ne arrives at a situation where the truly large-scale test can 
only result in the statement that a given device functioned at a particular time and 
place. A general conclusion is impossible. [...O]ne may call such large-scale inte-
gral tests ‘happenings’”.27 Not unlike a happening in the art world, this means that 
only those who were present are able to join in the conversation. And those who 
were not present know that the happening will not be repeatable in exactly the 
same way. Although, what gives the art aficionado a profit of distinction, only 
sets the scientist further back in the domain of hypotheticality. As an effect, in 
particular the branch which was concerned with disturbances in the interplay of 
various system components – later referred to as ‘structural dynamics’ – was 
                                                        
25
 See Willy Marth, Der Schnelle Brüter SNR 300 im Auf und Ab seiner Geschichte, 
(Karlsruhe: Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe GmbH, 1992), 54-62. See P. Ludwig 
and B. Hus, “Some Results of the 50MW Straight Tube Steam Generator Test in the 
TNO 50MW SCTF at Hengelo,” Summary Report. Study Group Meeting on Steam 
Generators for LMFBR Bensberg (1974), 269-281. 
26
 See e.g. D. D. Stepnewski et al., Proceedings of the Fast Reactor Safety Meeting, ed. 
ANS Technical Group for Nuclear Reactor Safety, Beverly Hills, CA (1974). 
27
 Häfele, “Hypotheticality,” 54. 
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delegated to computer simulation models from the late 1960s onwards.28 The next 
two sections will discuss these various systems analysis and computer simulation 
techniques. 
 
Systems Analysis and World Energy Models 
The FRG’s research in civil nuclear energy of the 1970s was to a good part de-
voted to a computer modelling discourse which at the latest gained world-wide 
attention by Dennis Meadows’s Limits to Growth (1972) – systems analysis. It 
developed as a method from the Operational Research (OR) techniques of World 
War II. As an interdisciplinary approach, OR connected formerly separated mili-
tary domains in a quantitative and qualitative optimization strategy and consulting 
format for strategic planning, with anti-submarine warfare as its seminal exam-
ple.29 Systems analysis pursued this approach mainly in the context of economic 
and ‘socio-technical’ problems after 1945. Coined by Edward W. Paxson at 
RAND Corporation, the term baptized a whole think tank with the foundation of 
IIASA in 1973. Leen Hordijk, a former director of IIASA, characterized the think 
tank’s systems analysis philosophy retrospectively according to the following 
scheme – with computer simulation playing an outstanding role on all its stages: 
First, we marshal all the information and scientific knowledge 
available on the problem in question; if necessary, we gather new 
evidence and develop new knowledge. Second, we determine what 
the goals of the stakeholders are, both of the people and the institu-
tions. Third, we explore different alternative ways of achieving 
those goals, and we design or invent new options, where appropri-
ate. Fourth, we reconsider the problem in light of the knowledge 
accumulated. Fifth, we estimate the impacts of the various possible 
courses of action, taking into account the uncertain future and the 
organizational structures that are required to implement our pro-
posals. Sixth, we compare the alternatives by making a detailed as-
sessment of possible impacts and consequences. Seventh, we pre-
sent the results of the study in a framework that facilitates choice 
by the stakeholders. Eighth, we provide follow-up assistance. 
Ninth, we evaluate the results. Please note that computer modeling 
                                                        
28
 See Stepnewski et al., Proceedings of the Fast Reactor Safety Meeting, ix. See Wolf 
Häfele, Ferdinand Heller and Wolfgang Schikarski, The Principle of Double Contain-
ment and the Behavior of Aerosols in its Relation to the Safety of Reactors with a high 
Plutonium Inventory (Karlsruhe: Gesellschaft für Kernforschung M.B.H., 1967). 
29
 See Claus Pias, Computer Spiel Welten (Zürich/Berlin: Diaphanes, 2002), 231-234, 
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is a useful device in helping obtain answers at any of the above 
stages.30 
Scenaric projections – not prognoses, a distinction that already the authors of the 
Report to the Club of Rome underlined emphatically –, based on numerical com-
puter simulations, become operative on two distinct levels: One the one hand, 
systems analysis was used to integrate Fast Breeder technology in world-wide 
energy production and consumption scenarios – with the department of Energy 
Systems at IIASA as an instructive example. On the other, it served as a technique 
for the concrete planning and assessment of the nuclear facility in Kalkar. Whilst 
Daniel Meadows’s Limits to Growth – together with its underlying model of Jay 
W. Forrester’s World Dynamics and its focus on “Resources”, “Population”, “Pol-
lution”, “Capital”, und “Agriculture”31 – only indirectly addressed the matter of 
energy supply, the scientists in Häfele’s IIASA department explicitly centred 
around the latter. 
In an attempt to anticipate the broad criticism that Meadows’s demanding 
and far-reaching report was facing – for instance, its scenarios were perceived as 
mere toplofty computer games – the Energy Systems group was eager to empha-
size that their scenarios only approached more concrete short- and mid-term pro-
jections, covering 15 to 30 years.32 The individual studies of the group have been 
compiled to a sort of technical report, published under the title Energy in a Finite 
World. A Global Systems Analysis at the beginning of the 1980s.33 The report was 
based upon a system of five simulation models which not only served as a ‘pro-
jector’ of two possible – and antagonistic – future ‘energy worlds’. The models 
also synthesized a multiperspective analysis of attainable alternative energy 
sources and of technological developments with rather intuitive presumptions, for 
instance regarding the delivery rate of fossil fuels. Or, as the author of a commen-
tary on the study put it: “The study makes use of scenario writing as a principal 
tool to investigate energy futures. These scenarios are not predictions, as the fu-
ture is unpredictable; however, conducting studies such as these is necessary for 
responsibly dealing today with implications for tomorrow.”34 More concretely, 
the models can be differentiated along the following layout: 
                                                        
30
 Leen Hordijk, “What is Systems Analysis?,” in Options Magazine Winter 2007, ac-
cessed August 22, 2013, http://www.iiasa.ac.at/web/home/about/whatisiiasa/ 
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31
 Donella H. Meadows et al., The Limits to Growth (New York: Universe, 1972), 89. 
32
 See Paul S. Basile, “The IIASA Set of Energy Models: Its Design and Application,” 
IIASA Working Paper RR-80-31 (1980), 11. 
33
 See Häfele, Energy in a Finite World. 
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The model set, long in development and following the initiative 
and guidance of Professor Wolf Häfele, includes several models: 
an accounting framework type energy demand model, a dynamic 
linear programming energy supply and conversion system model, 
an input-output model for calculating the impacts of alternative en-
ergy scenarios, a macroeconomic model, and an oil trade gaming 
model. The models have been designed into an integrated set for 
long-term, global analyses.35 
This modelling strategy is significant for the research group precisely because it 
encompasses the possibility to generate a high level of interactive couplings, ac-
counting for a far larger number of system parameters. One could state that the 
predicaments of data-driven science become prevalent decades before the con-
temporary discussions around big data technologies.36 Already in the modelling 
process, it was crucial to assign to the output parameters an interpretable and not 
misleading amount of data in order to create novel insights. Further, this set of 
models produced instructive and reproducible results, because its basic logics 
were transparent and comprehensible. Such results, say the authors, could not 
replace but enhance careful reasoning. Moreover, computer simulations provided 
a consistent environment for the numerical calculation and classification of multi-
ple, different scenarios. And last but not least, computer simulations enabled a 
self-critical and self-reflective evaluation of the results and the models by trial-
and-error, as their formal structure could be ‘validated’ internally against com-
parative possible future scenarios, or externally against competing alternative 
simulation models.37 
In these times of the Limits to Growth report, when the limitation of natu-
ral resources was perceived as the most pressing crisis for industrialized societies, 
the consideration of nuclear energy as a possible solution to societal needs instead 
of a threat to these societies becomes more reasonable. Thus, it is not a coinci-
dence that Fast Breeders played a significant role in the nonchalantly devised fu-
ture energy supply scenarios at IIASA: Calculating with an at least linear increase 
in world-wide energy demands, according to one scenario, a system of 3000 
LMFBRs and High Temperature Reactors (with an output of 3300 MW per unit), 
combined with 650 temporary and 47 terminal nuclear waste repositories and 
various facilities for the production of chemicals and fuels (like hydrogen), would 
                                                        
35
 Basile, “IIASA Set of Energy Models”, 2. 
36
 See Joachim Müller-Jung, “Wird ‘Big Data’ zur Chiffre für den digitalen GAU?,” 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, March 04, 2013, accessed May 02, 2014, 
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easily provide the world of 2030 with energy and useful by-products, manufac-
tured by using the process heat of the plants. This, state the authors, would be 
realizable by an almost closed nuclear fuel cycle, demanding only 8500 tons of 
uranium or thorium. In comparison, a coal-based energy production would 
amount to a requirement of 18,3 billion tons.38 And also solar energy is compara-
tively considered: However, if designed to meet the projected future energy 
needs, the area to be covered by solar panels would amount to “about 20 times the 
area of Germany”39 – hardly a viable and environmentally sustainable way, the 
IIASA report asserts. 
If one realizes how such encompassing CS made possible a quantified 
comparison of apples and oranges in the same computational framework, it be-
comes more understandable how someone would have developed the idea of con-
structing a ‘messy’ technology as a Fast Breeder in the first place: The dangers of 
any possible energy source are situated on the very same level and in a common 
matrix. As a part of a system of computer simulations, they become objects of the 
same media-technological condition of trial-and-error procedures which facilitate 
an ‘adequate’ and comparative assessment of their respective ‘dangerous’ poten-
tials. It is only this combined quantification of data and its transformation into 
qualitative computational scenarios which let projects like the SNR-300 appear as 
reasonable options. 
Alas, what on first sight would sound like a complete success story of a 
bright nuclear future becomes critical at the latest when more complex systems 
and more uncertainties of the real world break into the modelling logics of the 
involved systems analysis techniques. Take as an example that IIASA and the 
IAEA would only in hindsight realize certain apparent flaws in their reasoning: 
“Yet, together with the [...] IAEA an effort was made to understand the discrep-
ancy between the ‘objective’ risks of nuclear power and its perception by the pub-
lic.”40 Since the scenarios of the Energy Systems group and thus the projected 
outcomes and implications always rested upon speculative registers and were 
played out in the field of hypotheticality, they themselves became objects of com-
peting (and far less optimistic) counter-scenarios. These counter-scenarios thema-
tise for instance the fact that Fast Breeders produce not only nuclear fuels for 
other conventional reactor types, but also large amounts of weapons-grade pluto-
nium – and besides, also of highly radiant plutonium waste. Not only for fervid 
critics of the breeder technology like Robert Jungk, this perverted the proclaimed 
image of a clean and peaceful Atomic Age into an uncontrollable ‘plutonium-
                                                        
38
 See Wolf Häfele, “The Comparison of Energy Options – A Methodological Study,” 
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based economy’ and utterly doomed ‘plutonium world’.41 As a matter of fact, and 
due to the concentration of critical amounts of plutonium in its cores, fast breeders 
– unlike traditional reactors – not only run the risk of a nuclear meltdown, but also 
of a nuclear explosion. And even their location in sparsely populated and structur-
ally backward regions would hardly account for this circumstance. Some ten years 
after the publication of the IIASA studies, discrepancies like these and an ever 
more accelerating anti-nuclear protest culture would not only bring computer-
modelled plutonium worlds of a future FRG to the fall, but also its landmark and 
first concrete step into such a future: SNR-300. 
 
Designing Hypothetical Nuclear Power Plants 
Albeit, before its final decline in 1991, SNR-300 first had to surge – at least up to 
a certain point. And this concrete technical advancement had partly been based on 
systems analysis and computer simulations. The involved software applications 
more often than not were labelled with quite adventurous acronyms – until today, 
the invention of hilarious wordplays seems to remain an inextinguishable hobby 
of computer scientists, worth a separate paper. Already developed in the course of 
the KNK preliminary breeder projects, the software MUNDO (for MaximaleUN-
fallDOsis, translating to ‘maximum accidental dose’) simulated the diffusion of 
radioactive particles in the atmosphere after a hazardous incident. Its application, 
for instance, proved the essential benefit of double containment structures for re-
actor cores. These enabled filter- and disintegration processes of leaked radioac-
tive material inside a second insulation structure. MUNDO calculated such inter-
nal processes along with the possible reduction of danger for atmospheric con-
tamination outside of the facility. It leads to an active protection procedure which 
was highly relevant for plutonium-fuelled breeders, and which played a decisive 
role in the administrative approval in the early stage of the SNR-300 project. 
Complementary, and under the impact of the partial meltdown of the Fermi-I ex-
perimental breeder in Newport, MI, not far from Detroit, a team in the US devel-
oped the encompassing security software – nomen est omen – MELT-III. It nu-
                                                        
41
 See Roland Kollert and Inge Schmitz-Feuerhake, “Die Plutoniumopfer eines ausgebau-
ten Brütersystems. Versuch einer Abschätzung,” in Die Gefahren der Plutoniumwirt-
schaft, ed. Günter Altner and Inge Schmitz-Feuerhake (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 
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merically modelled a variety of possible thermal and hydraulic reactions in the 
course of a nuclear meltdown.42 
Other software tools simulated diverse operations in the abovementioned 
field of structural dynamics. These encompassed, among others, steam explo-
sions, interaction between natrium cooling cycles and reactor fuels, the deforma-
tion of fuel rods by pressure variation in the cooling agents, heat exchangers,43 the 
shielding capacity of different materials, the calculation of neutron collisions, or 
models of turbines.44 Add to that the digital “scale model tests” of complete 
breeder facilities.45 All these applications had one thing in common: They mod-
elled processes whose exploration under a traditional paradigm of experimenta-
tion would have been too dangerous or plainly impossible. Although, this did not 
at all imply that the models would converge to one feasible and realistic proce-
dure in the course of their iterated trial-and-error runs. Rather, they generated a 
comparability of multiple hypothetical cases and served as an advisory, as tools 
for thought for the apprehension of promising actions and constructional imple-
mentations. 
But even in this regard, the computer programs were subject to multiple 
limitations. First and foremost, the development of the program codes was de-
pendent on the “availability of effective calculating machines”.46 During the 
SNR-300 project, for instance, the “flow distribution of neutrons in the beginning 
could only be resolved in a one-dimensional diffusion approximation”. Not before 
the acquisition of faster computer hardware, “one turned [...] to a two- and three-
dimensional treatment.”47 Second, the latencies of software systems oftentimes 
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 See Ferdinand Heller, Wolfgang Schikarski and A. Wickenhäuser, “MUNDO – Digital 
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inhibited the exploitation of already available computing resources. As late as 
1973, more than 10 years into the “German Manhattan Project”, the flexible and 
modular software system KAPROS replaced an apparently painstaking predeces-
sor. KAPROS integrated, among others, the program suites REX and FAUN-Z, 
developed by the SNR-300 project group to explore so-called Bethe-Tait Worst 
Case Scenarios,48 analogous to the US-American MELT-III software. The stage 
before the disintegration of a reactor was simulated by the software CAPRI-I, 
whose calculations relied on data input and model characteristics of sub-programs 
like the fuel rod simulation module BREDA or – and here again the acronym reads 
thoroughly self-deprecating – the boiling module BLOW 3. The simulation of the 
actual phase of disintegration and stress tests of the containment structures again 
involved further software applications49 Hence, and despite such efforts in terms 
of modularizing the software, different processes continued to be modelled by a 
variety of specialized, independent CS programs. The respective white papers 
give little insight regarding their respective integrativity. It remains disputable 
whether these computer programs had been integrated to a similar extend as those 
of the IIASA energy studies and if they, as a result, provided a comparable ana-
lytic framework.  
And finally, the mentioned programming and simulation efforts attached 
to a fundamental problem: How appropriate would their codes represent the real-
world processes in question? In this regard, mathematician Keith Miller of Berke-
ley University publicly criticized the codes which were used in the US to generate 
scenarios of nuclear incidents. In Walter Cronkite’s CBS news show on May 12, 
1976, he stated that these were “totally inadequate to the complexity of the prob-
lem [..., and therefore] just as reliable as tomorrow’s prediction of the weather, 
and I wouldn’t trust my life on tomorrow’s prediction of the weather.”50 To un-
derline his statement, Miller elucidated the work flows of the respective code de-
velopment processes. Some working groups dealt with “advanced codes” for fu-
ture software versions. Other teams checked the correspondence of these codes to 
real-life-phenomena by verification studies. And further groups calculated the 
actually ongoing construction processes with antecedent – and therefore, already 
outdated – program versions. The mathematician furthermore added three obser-
vations: First, the codes used for calculating the construction processes oftentimes 
would not correspond with those employed for the evaluation of, for example, 
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security measures. Second, the margins which defined the possible scope of iden-
tifying problematic incidents were set too narrow. And third, Miller demanded the 
application of a larger number of large-scale simulations. Even in the ‘virtual’, he 
stated, due to limited computing capacities, more often than not only sub-
components and sub-systems were tested, and the risk potential of the large-scale 
system thus would only be extrapolated from these tests.51 
Although, Miller’s last argument was itself countered by another categori-
cal remark: According to Richard T. Lahey, one of the leading nuclear experts of 
the US in the 1970s, the simulation of large-scale systems was “absolutely the 
worst test to run to get data”. For the not even remotely comprehensible multiplic-
ity of involved variables and factor combinations would inhibit the necessary, 
detailed identification and reconstruction of critical disturbances.52 Analogue to 
the IIASA energy studies, the engineering simulations of actual nuclear facility 
constructions were also facing a tremendous big data-problem. 
 
Making History, Changing Futures 
A media history of nuclear technology in the 1970s, with Fast Breeder programs 
as its epitome, reveals some of the essential elements of an epistemology of com-
puter simulation. As systematic approaches to conquer new fields of knowledge, 
CS developed into ground-breaking technologies in big science projects – espe-
cially in research fields with a high amount of hypotheticality. The complexity 
and criticality of nuclear technology seemed predestined for their application, be 
it in a broad framework of socio-economic systems analysis studies, or in the con-
crete case of a system of – more or less integrated – engineering simulations. 
However, and despite the appliance of CS in construction and technologi-
cal impact assessment, quite large problem areas remained a field for speculation: 
Fast Breeders came into existence as “happenings’, they literally ‘took place’, be 
it inside of simulation scenarios or outside in the ‘real world’. Such forms of hap-
penings could only be flanked by passive or active security measures built in the 
physical constructions. But as we have seen, these are often themselves based on 
questionable codes and scenarios. 
All these measures contain a structural residual risk larger than zero. How 
large exactly this residual risk was allowed to be was the subject of negotiation 
processes between technological, economical, and political factors and agents. 
These negotiations ultimately defined what was meant by ‘safety’, and which cri-
teria would qualify ‘safe’ as safe. For advocates of the atomic age like Wolf 
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Häfele, the benefits of nuclear energy always clearly outnumbered their dangers. 
All other critical reservations were considered as inappropriate interpretations in 
the age of hypotheticality. And in the case of doubt, at least Häfele preferred to 
lead a wild and dangerous life in view of the potentials of the atom.53 
The afterlife of this systematic appliance of computer simulations in criti-
cal environments and its effects on our contemporary situation on the one hand 
becomes obvious in the discourse of climate change. Not coincidentally, some 
scientists claimed a necessary world-wide ‘renaissance of nuclear energy’.54 On 
the other hand, the afterlife functions on a more fundamental level, driven by the 
temporal logics of these novel media technologies: CS generate a variety of pos-
sible futures and rationalities, and at the same time describe and operationalize 
them. Culminations like residual risk, worst case scenario, climate catastrophe, 
peak oil or the telling Cold War acronym MAD (for Mutual Assured Destruction) 
emerge precisely in those media-historical situations when computer simulations 
made feasible a Thinking About the Unthinkable55 (Herman Kahn): by distin-
guishing between multiple projective scenarios, and by providing the conditions 
to evaluate and choose the most and least desirable futures. Moreover, CS deline-
ate solution strategies for exactly the crises and catastrophes that only could have 
been formulated under their media-technological condition. CS thus gain their 
significance to a lesser extend in correspondence to ‘real’ events, but rather to the 
prevention of such events. Today, as ever more sophisticated CS model the be-
haviors and futures of complex systems across almost all scientific disciplines, 
they ever more impose a particular understanding of the world: Due to its future-
orientation (and media-technological ‘future-adjustability’), this world can only 
conceive of itself in terms of perpetual crises. Every present time now is faced 
with the haut gôut of deficiency, because it is permanently confronted with a mul-
tiplicity of futures. These are presently ‘happening’ as media-technological opera-
tionalizations, and thus force their technological principles of optimization, effi-
ciency, and stability upon that very present time. 
But at least in the 1970s, such a far-reaching age of hypotheticality re-
mained utterly uncontrollable. And the media history of SNR-300 gives an im-
pressive disclosure of this fact: Even the avantgarde of hypothetical scientific 
research and its media technologies proved incapable for dealing with the socio-
economic dynamics of the emerging anti-nuclear movement in the FRG – a 
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movement which organized and radicalized itself precisely around megalomaniac 
nuclear projects like the Fast Breeder. Finally, the epistemology of hypotheticality 
was ultimately challenged as something actually happened in the ‘happenings’: 
The incidents of Three Miles Island (USA, 1979), and even more profoundly of 
Chernobyl (USSR, 1986) messed up all the former scenarios. In the face of these 
incidents, a normative power of the factual overwrote the variables of the “ven-
turous speculative research styles”56 of CS. This ‘factual reality’ generated – at 
least in the FRG and for the SNR-300 project – novel contingencies with ever 
more influential socio-political and ecological variables. And these underesti-
mated ‘risks’ could not be reduced to a viable level by CS – there was no scenario 
for nuclear phaseout in the database of the “archpriests of the Atomic Age.”57 
After the anti-nuclear movement had opted against nuclear hypotheticali-
ties and had brought the German Manhattan Project to the fall, alternative future 
scenarios came into being, sometimes even turning away from the doctrines of 
economic growth and technological progress. IIASA switched to the research of 
more sustainable energy sources and ‘green technologies’ in the post-Häfele era, 
eliminating Fast Breeders from the scenarios already in the mid-1980s. And at the 
beginning of the 1990s, after never having become equipped with radioactive ma-
terial, let alone having become critical, the liquid natrium cooling cycles of SNR-
300 – which had been desolately run for six years – were switched off, and the 
Breeder was shut down. From that moment on, the future of SNR-300 took shape 
as the utmost improbable and extremely hypothetical afterlife as an amusement 
park. But what remained undisturbed by this decline was the ever increasing rele-
vance of computer simulations as media technologies and cultural techniques58 
which continue to set up or present futures and future present. 
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